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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
The United States juvenile justice system was originally viewed as a source of 
protection, redirection, and rehabilitation for troubled youth. Ideally, the system functions 
as a preventative measure to ensure youth stay out of trouble as adults, and live fulfilling 
lives in their communities. Today, the U.S. leads the world in incarceration rates, calling 
into question the juvenile justice system’s success in redirecting youth. 1 When instituting 
sanctions and designing crime prevention programs, legislators may not have envisioned 
imprisoning massive numbers of adults and juveniles.  
Unfortunately, today, the juvenile justice system appears to feed rather than 
prevent high rates of adult incarceration. Furthermore, the juvenile justice contributes to 
racial disparities that plague the criminal justice system. One in three black men are 
imprisoned in their lifetime, compared to one in seventeen white men.2 Given that contact 
with the juvenile justice system greatly increases an individual’s chance of coming into 
contact with the adult criminal justice system, these racial disparities pervade the entire 
criminal justice system. For example, while African-Americans comprise 14% of the 
youth population, they make up 40% of the incarcerated youth population.3  
To remedy racial disparities in juvenile justice, in 1988, the Justice Department 
instituted a mandate entitled Disproportionate Minority Confinement, which required 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The Sentencing Project, “Juvenile Justice,” accessed May 13, 2014 
<http://www.sentencingproject.org/template/page.cfm?id=184> 
2 The Sentencing Project, “Racial Disparity,” accessed May 14, 2014 
<http://www.sentencingproject.org/template/page.cfm?id=122>	  
3 The Sentencing Project, “Policy Brief: Disproportionate Minority Contact,” accessed 
May 14, 2014 < 
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/jj_Disproportionate%20Minority%20Conta
ct.pdf> 
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states to address the overwhelming rates of imprisoned minority youth.4 In 2002, the 
Justice Department expanded the mandate to include other instances of racial disparities 
in the system, including arrest rates, and findings of delinquency. Known as 
Disproportionate Minority Contact, this mandate continues to function today. In each 
instance, the federal government provided funding to states to research and remedy 
overrepresentation of minority youth in the juvenile justice system. 
 
Historical Context: The OJJDP, Task Force on Juvenile Delinquency, and 
Disproportionate Minority Confinement  
 
 In order to understand Disproportionate Minority Contact’s legislative role today, 
we must first trace its legislative history. In 1974, Congress passed the Juvenile Justice 
and Delinquency Prevention Act. Although states possess the authority to establish 
independent juvenile court systems, the Act created an oversight organization in the 
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. The Office, also known as the 
OJJDP, institutes mandates, provides resources and information for improvement, and 
distributes funding, which is at least partly dependent on state compliance with federal 
regulations. In effect, the Office plays a roll in regulating state juvenile justice system 
practices and policies.5  
In the late 1970’s, the Justice Department created a Task Force to recommend 
additional organizational and structural changes to the evolving juvenile justice system. 
This Task Force, entitled the National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Coleman, Andrea R., “A Disproportionate Minority Contact (DMC) Chronology: 1988 
to Date,” accessed April 30, 2014 < http://www.ojjdp.gov/dmc/chronology.html>  
5 Jones, Elizabeth N., “Disproportionate Representation of Minority Youth in the Juvenile 
Justice System: A Lack of Clarity and Too Much Disparity Among States ‘Addressing’ 
the Issue,” UC Davis J. Juv. L. & Pol’y 155 (2012).  
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consolidated national perspective and opinion on current juvenile justice matters. Task 
Force committee members included state politicians, social workers, attorneys, and 
academics. Their report entitled, Report of the Task Force on Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention contained over 800 pages, addressing both organizational and 
procedural matters. Organizational matters included community supervision of juveniles, 
intake services, and delinquency prevention programs. Procedural matters governed 
relationships between courts and community services, established guidelines for 
detention centers, and advised court structure. These recommendations ultimately served 
to facilitate greater uniformity among state juvenile justice systems.6   
Concerns over racial disparities in juvenile delinquency surfaced in the late 
1970’s, with the Task Force’s preliminary findings. Their report began with a general 
background on juvenile crime in America, suggesting explicit racial disparities. The 
authors discussed a recent upward trend in youth crime, where minority youth crime 
occurred in abundance. The following graph tracked juvenile arrests according to race 
and offense for the year 1974. Racial categories for this measurement include only 
“whites” and “blacks.”  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 National Advisory Committee On Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. Report of the 
Task Force on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (Washington, D.C: 1976), 
1976. 
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7 
 
According to the 1970 census, 87.5% of Americans identified as white, and 11.1% 
identified as black.8 According to the data displayed above, white youth constituted 
75.2% of total arrests, and black youth constituted 22.5% of arrests. At this time, black 
youth were arrested at twice the rate than their proportion in the general population. Even 
more troubling, black youth constituted 58.8% of murder and non-negligent manslaughter 
arrests, and 53.5% of arrests for rape.9 These statistics suggest racial imbalances exist in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Ibid, 4.  
8 U.S. Census Bureau, “Table 1. United States- Race and Hispanic Origin: 1790 to 1990,” 
accessed April 30, 2014 (2002) 
<http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0056/tab01.pdf> 
9 Ibid. 
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minority youth offending patterns. However, this rather simplistic data set certainly calls 
for more detailed data gathering and population analysis.  
To better understand statewide and national trends in crime, the report 
acknowledges the need for uniform research and evaluation methods. The authors write 
that ideally, the data analysis will reveal target populations that the justice system, along 
with community organizations, can work with to prevent future arrests, charges, and 
incarcerations. Increased analysis should enable law enforcement officials to better 
address the needs of youth, and in turn, take steps to prevent delinquency. The data 
should also analyze and chart the rates by which juveniles pass through the juvenile 
justice system. For example, the Task Force calls for specific data on the rates by which 
police arrest juveniles, judges find juveniles guilty of crimes, and detain those convicted, 
according to locality, gender, age, and race. Additionally, the report advises that states 
monitor overcrowding at juvenile detention facilities, track the length of detention 
sentences, and quantify the number of juveniles on probation. Ultimately, the Task Force 
argues that research and evaluation should comprise a normal function in the juvenile 
justice system budget. Age, sex, racial and ethnic categories anchor these various 
examinations.10 Herein lie the seeds for Disproportionate Minority Contact, the 
legislation that emerged 14 years later.  
In 1988, Congress passed amendments to the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention Act of 1974, establishing the Disproportionate Minority Confinement 
mandate, which required states to address disproportionality among detained or confined 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 National Advisory Committee On Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, supra note #5, 
33-38.  
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minority juveniles. Disproportionality was identified by comparing the proportion of 
minorities in detention or confinement to their proportion in the general population.11 
It is important to note that reducing racial disparities in juvenile confinement did 
not constitute the only initiative spearheaded by the OJJDP. When the Juvenile Justice 
and Delinquency Prevention Act originally passed in 1974, the bill carried two concrete 
policy initiatives or “core requirements.” 12 The first initiative sought to de-
institutionalize status offenders. De-institutionalizing an individual involves removing 
that youth from a secure detention or correctional facility.13 This requirement sought to 
limit contact between status offenders and youth involved in serious criminal activity, 
like those indicted for armed robbery, rape, and murder.14 The term “status offenders” 
refers to youth charged with delinquencies that are not criminal adult acts. For example, 
youth considered status offenders include runaways and truants, or those found smoking 
cigarettes and consuming alcohol.15 Confining these two youth populations together has 
serious implications for mental health, growth, and development, and may promote the 
criminality of rebellious teens.16  
The second policy initiative established by the 1974 Act materialized in the “sight 
and sound” provision. This statute intended to keep adult prisoners and confined youth 
from interacting in secure facilities. Juveniles should not be able to see (sight) or hear 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Coleman, Andrea R., supra note #3. 
12 Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 42 U.S.C 5601 note.  
13  American Institutes for Research. “About Deinstitutionalization of Status Offenders 
(DSO),” accessed November 24, 2013 <http://www.juvenilejustice-
tta.org/resources/dso/about-dso> 
14 Jones, Elizabeth N., supra note #4, 160-162.  
15 Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. “Glossary.” Accessed 
November 24, 2013. <http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/glossary.html> 
16 Krisberg, Barry. Juvenile Justice: Redeeming Our Children. (California: Sage 
Publications: 2005). 
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(sound) adult prisoners at any time.17  Policy makers believed sheltering youth from adult 
criminals would deter future criminality.  
In 1980, legislators furthered the original sight and sound mandate by adding the 
“jail removal” provision as an amendment to the JJDP Act. This statute prohibited 
juveniles from being placed in adult jails and facilities altogether, sparking construction 
of detention centers exclusively for youth populations.18 
 The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act would not be revised again 
until 2002, when legislators shifted Disproportionate Minority Confinement to 
Disproportionate Minority Contact. The Contact mandate requires states to examine 
racial disparities at each level of the juvenile justice system, including arrests, 
delinquency findings, and transfers to adult court.19 
 
Contemporary Analysis  
According to the Task Force Report on Juvenile Justice, in 1974, as we saw 
earlier, 75.2% of juveniles arrested identified as white, and 22.5% identified as black. In 
2002, 71.5% of juveniles arrested identified as white, and 25.7% as black.20 By 2012, 
65.2% of juveniles arrested identified as white, and 32.2% as black.21 Over the past 38 
years, thus, African-American youth contact with the justice system has increased and 
become more disproportionate, despite the fact that the DMC mandate was in effect for 
25 of these 38 years. Although Disproportionate Minority Contact may have a marginal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Jones, Elizabeth N., supra note #4, 161-162.  
18 Ibid, 160-162. 
19 These levels of the juvenile justice system, known formally as contact points, are 
explained in Chapter 2 of this project.  
20 FBI. “Crime in the U.S., 2002- Persons Arrested,” Uniform Crime Reports Accessed 
December 13, 2013. 
21 FBI. “Arrests by Race, 2012.” Uniform Crime Reports. 
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affect on minority contact with the juvenile justice system, the system continues to 
disproportionately impact minority communities.  
So what’s gone wrong? How exactly did politicians construct and change the 
original Disproportionate Minority Confinement mandate? How have states implemented 
the mandate? Why do racial disparities among juveniles entering the juvenile justice 
system persist, despite state efforts to track and combat these trends? Ultimately, how can 
we better understand the limits of federal legislation, particularly when directed to state 
and local juvenile justice systems to change the patterns of juvenile crime and contact 
with the criminal justice system? Answering these questions involves untangling a web of 
congressional debates, non-profit research, institutional data collection methods, 
contemporary state analysis, societal factors contributing to criminality, as well as the 
structure of the federal bureaucracy, justice system, and juvenile justice offices. The 
enormous scope of the Disproportionate Minority Contact mandate, considering varying 
state and local juvenile system and criminal justice structures, as well as racial disparities 
embedded in other state institutions, provides many challenges to states fulfilling the 
mandate.  
Chapter 2 explores the legislative history behind Disproportionate Minority 
Confinement, and the transition to Disproportionate Minority Contact in 2002. Chapter 3 
discusses contemporary state DMC studies, analyzing variations and problems associated 
with implementing the mandate. Chapter 4 examines the factors fueling racial disparities 
in juvenile delinquency, revealing the major failures of the Disproportionate Minority 
Contact mandate. Examining the troubles associated with constructing and implementing 
the mandate, coupled with the mandate’s inability to target the roots of crime, provides an 
	   9	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CHAPTER 2 
The History of Disproportionate Minority Contact 
 
What exactly is the Disproportionate Minority Contact mandate, and how did it 
come about? This chapter provides the historical and legal background to two federal 
mandates: Disproportionate Minority Confinement and Disproportionate Minority 
Contact.  
Introduction  
In 1974, Congress passed the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act. 
This legislation created the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 
providing oversight to the modern juvenile justice system.22 This oversight included 
research into various policies and practices in local juvenile justice systems. Beginning in 
the late 1970’s, some of that research by government and independent organizations 
uncovered racial inequalities in the juvenile justice system. In 1974, for example, 55.3% 
of juveniles arrested for violent crimes were identified as black at a time when blacks 
constituted only 11.1% of the population.23 This statistic, among others, brought racial 
disparities in the juvenile justice system to federal legislators’ attention.  
In the late-1980’s, Congress began the process to reauthorize the Juvenile Justice 
and Delinquency Prevention Act. During a series of hearings, Congress started to discuss 
the large numbers of minority youth in the criminal justice system.24 During this time, 
researchers from national organizations presented alarming data regarding youth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 42 U.S.C 5601 note. 
23 National Advisory Committee On Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, supra note #4, 
4; U.S. Census Bureau, supra note #7. 
24 U.S. House. Committee on Education and Labor. Hearing to Reauthorize The Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, 11 September 1987. (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1988). (Y4. Ed 8/1 100-51). 
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incarceration rates, and urged the Justice Department to spearhead a mission to change 
these patterns. In 1986, Ira Schwartz, Director of The Center for the Study of Youth 
Policy, testified before the House Subcommittee on Human Resources that minority 
youth constituted over half the population of incarcerated juveniles.25 In 1988, Congress 
publically acknowledged this worrisome statistic and instituted the Disproportionate 
Minority Confinement (DMC) mandate. This provision required states to measure and 
remedy high rates of incarcerated minority youth, and provided funding to support these 
efforts.26 But it is important to note that Disproportionate Minority Confinement 
comprised a small proportion of juvenile policy making in 1988. Although reducing 
racial disparities in the juvenile justice system did not become the focus of criminal 
justice policy making, the DMC legislation spurred important studies and conversations 
across the country.  
After the Disproportionate Minority Confinement mandate, independent 
organizations continued to research and analyze minority youth involvement with the 
juvenile justice system. In 1988, the National Coalition of State Juvenile Justice Advisory 
Groups dedicated their annual conference to this topic.27 The conference’s product, a 
1989 report entitled A Delicate Balance, challenged policy makers to continue to engage 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Kempf-Leonard, Kimberly, Carl E. Pope and William H. Feyerherm. Minorities In 
Juvenile Justice. (California, Sage Publications: 1995), 7.  
26 U.S. House. Committee on Education and Labor. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention Amendments of 1988 (H. Rpt. 100-605). (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1990). 
27 Created by the JJDP Act of 1974, State Advisory Groups are funded by the Office of 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention to work with state agencies on 
“prevention, intervention, and treatment of juvenile delinquency.”  (Office of Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention. “State Advisory Groups, State Planning Agencies, 
and Juvenile Justice Specialists” in FY 2003 Drug-Free Communities Support Program 
<http://ojjdp.gov/dfcsgrant/stateadvisorgrps.pdf>  
	   12	  
questions surrounding racial inequality in the juvenile justice system, ensuring these 
matters did not get swept under the rug.28 In 1991, a Senate hearing took place in 
Washington, D.C. to exclusively address this matter.29 During this hearing, Senator Joe 
Biden stated that on an average day 53,000 juveniles were held in custody. Of these, 
30,000 were minorities.30 In response to these troubling findings, in 1992, legislators 
elevated the Disproportionate Minority Confinement mandate to a Justice Department 
core requirement.31 By doing so Congress tied a proportion of future funding from OJJDP 
to a state’s completion of research and initiatives on Disproportionate Minority 
Confinement, furthering interest in identifying and remedying racial inequalities in the 
state and local juvenile justice systems.   
 As states gathered and reported data to the Justice Department, concerns deepened 
regarding minority interaction with the juvenile justice system.32 In 2002, the Justice 
Department broadened the Confinement mandate to Disproportionate Minority Contact 
(DMC). Instead of concentrating efforts on the confined juvenile population, the Contact 
provision includes every checkpoint in the juvenile justice system, from arrest to 
incarceration. Like the Confinement mandate, the Justice Department requires states to 
detect overrepresentation of minority groups, identify the sources of this inequality, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 National Coalition of State Juvenile Justice Advisory Groups. A Delicate Balance 
(Washington, D.C: 1989) 
29 U.S. Senate. Committee on The Judiciary. Hearing on Minority Overrepresentation in 
the Juvenile Justice System, 25 June 1991. Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1991. (Y4. J89/2 S. hrg.) 
30 Ibid, 8-9. 
31 Coleman, Andrea R., supra note #3.  
32 Devine, Patricia, Kathleen Coolbaugh and Susan Jenkins, “Disproportionate Minority 
Confinement: Lessons Learned From Five States,” Juvenile Justice Bulletin (1998) 
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remedy racial disparities in their local juvenile justice systems.33 As we will see, the 
definitions of overrepresentation, disproportionality, inequality and disparity evolve and 
change.  
The 2002 Contact mandate represents the last significant policy initiative 
regarding minority youth overrepresentation in the criminal justice system. Although the 
legislation has not been reauthorized since this time, legislators annually approve funding 
for the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), and state 
initiatives endure.34 Today, however, Disproportionate Minority Contact plays a very 
small role in the context of all juvenile justice policy.  
Legislators have not reviewed the mandate’s language since 2002, and therefore, 
several contentious points persist. Specifically, policy makers fail to define what level of 
“disproportionality” is acceptable. As a result, researchers and juvenile justice 
professionals do not approach redressing inequalities with a clear goal in mind. 
Furthermore, increased racial diversity in the population, influenced by immigration, 
means that simplistic racial categories used to analyze the distribution of minority youth 
in the juvenile justice system may fail to reflect local realities. More specifically, 
categories such as African-American or Black, Asian, and Hispanic/Latino fail to 
accurately represent the diversity of the juvenile population.35 Not many individuals 
closely identify with one of these broad categories. For example, the African-American 
or black category encompasses Americans with dark skin, but also individuals from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Coleman, Andrea R., supra note #3. 
34 Thomas Library of Congress. “Bill Summary and Status - 111th Congress (2009-2010) 
– H.R. 6029,” http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:hr6029: Accessed 
November 25, 2013.  
35 Rodriguez, Clara E. Changing Race: Latinos, the Census, and the History of Ethnicity 
in the United States. (New York, New York University Press: 2000)  
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across the continent of Africa, as well as people from Haiti, and elsewhere in the 
Caribbean.36 Individuals often draw upon complicated, dynamic ancestries and 
backgrounds to orient their personal identity. The meaning of minority changes over time 
and place, but government research remains static. Therefore, these broad categories 
become increasingly meaningless overtime, reducing the value of the research and 
making it less helpful in identifying potential changes in policy to reduce 
disproportionality.  
Federal legislators, so far removed from the localities where juvenile justice plays 
out, have failed to implement effective policy to measure and redress racial inequalities in 
the juvenile justice system. Ultimately, the language of the Disproportionate Minority 
Contact mandate itself is ineffective in instituting a positive change regarding racial 
disparities in juvenile justice.  
 
Disproportionate Minority Confinement: Constructing the Mandate 
 Aside from federally funded state research, throughout the 1970s, several 
independent non-profit organizations began studying racial disparities in the juvenile 
justice system. Both the Center for the Study of Youth Policy and the National Council 
on Crime and Delinquency examined this topic extensively. Ira Schwartz and Barry 
Krisberg, Directors of these two organizations, presented their data to the House in 1986 
and 1987, respectively. Ultimately, their findings brought racial disparities in juvenile 
detention centers into the national spotlight, and contributed directly to the 
Disproportionate Minority Confinement mandate in 1988. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 U.S. Census Bureau, “Information on Race,” accessed April 30, 2014 
<http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/meta/long_RHI125212.htm> 
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 By the mid-1980’s, discussion of minority youth involvement in the justice 
system reached the Congressional floor. Ira Schwartz, Director of The Center for the 
Study of Youth Policy, testified before Congress on this matter in 1986. At this time, the 
House Subcommittee on Human Resources oversaw minority youth involvement in the 
criminal justice system. During his testimony, Schwartz repeated the statistic that 
minority youth constituted more than half of the incarcerated juvenile population. The 
data suggested that even when individuals of the same race committed the same crimes, 
minority youth experienced incarceration more often.37 Schwartz’ testimony indicated 
serious racial inequities across the juvenile justice system and suggested discriminatory 
treatment by law enforcement officials.  
 In 1987, Barry Krisberg from the National Council on Crime and Delinquency 
testified before the same Subcommittee. His testimony echoed and expanded on 
Schwartz’ earlier remarks. Krisberg demonstrated that minority youth experienced 
incarceration at rates higher than their proportion in the general population. For example, 
black males were three to four times more likely than their white peers to be incarcerated. 
Krisberg also explained that between 1977 and 1983, arrest rates for all juveniles 
declined, but minority youth incarceration increased by 26%.38 Additionally, the 
likelihood was greater for minority youth to be confined in public facilities, compared to 
white juveniles who were more often placed in private facilities. In 1982, 53% of 
confined juveniles were white, but 65% of juveniles in private facilities were white. 39 
Although neither public nor private facilities have reduced recidivism rates, 
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38 U.S. House. Committee on Education and Labor, supra note #23. 
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distinguishing between public and private facilities is significant due to the greater 
resources for juveniles in private facilities. Furthermore, segregated detention centers 
raise concerns over the government creating separate and unequal facilities for youth. 40 
Aside from his testimony, Krisberg’s co-authored article, entitled “Juvenile Corrections: 
Is There A Future?” was entered into the Congressional record. In the article, Krisberg 
wrote, “juvenile facilities are becoming minority enclaves in which conditions of 
confinement are becoming even more harsh.”41  
 Krisberg’s findings proved extremely worrisome to the Committee. First, he cited 
data supporting Schwartz’ claims that offending and arrest rates differed by race. This 
indicated that either minority youth commit more crimes than white youth and/or that 
systematic bias exists in policing and court processing, perpetuating racial disparities. 
Krisberg argued unemployment levels and the lack of community-based programs fueled 
high levels of minority youth incarceration, recognizing the relation of racial disparities 
in juvenile justice to racial inequalities in society. He urged the Justice Department to 
gather more data and conduct analyses to determine the roots of these patterns. Krisberg 
believed that if institutions, such as police departments and court systems, reformed their 
tactics and policies according to these findings, a decrease in minority incarceration rates 
might occur.42 Krisberg advocated a two-tiered approach to eliminate racial disparities in 
juvenile justice: institutional reforms in juvenile justice, but also understanding patterns 
of juvenile delinquency.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Bayer, Patrick and David E. Pozen. “The Effectiveness of Juvenile Correctional 
Facilities: Public Versus Private Management,” (November 2004) 
<http://www.econ.yale.edu/growth_pdf/cdp863.pdf> 
41 Ibid, 31-32. 
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 It is important to note that neither Schwartz’ 1986 nor Krisberg’s 1987 testimony 
took place during hearings specifically on minority youth and the juvenile justice system. 
Rather, the hearings were organized on much broader questions related to reauthorizing 
the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974. Thus, Krisberg did not 
speak exclusively on issues relating to minority youth incarceration, but also on the jail 
removal mandate and the juvenile correctional system, issues independent of racial 
inequalities in the juvenile justice system.43  
 During the reauthorization debates, issues of Disproportionate Minority 
Confinement failed to capture politicians’ attention for extended periods of time. 
Legislators apparently viewed this mandate as a minor issue in the grand scheme of 
juvenile justice policy. Perhaps the reauthorization hearing in Iowa on December 4, 1987 
best illustrates this attitude. The Iowa hearing focused exclusively on the first three 
provisions from the 1974 Act, namely, removing status offenders from secure facilities, 
separating juveniles and adult prisoners, and removing juveniles from adult jails 
altogether.44 Allison Fleming, the Chair of the Iowa State Advisory Group for Juvenile 
Justice, spoke extensively during the hearing. The only time Fleming mentioned minority 
youth was to suggest the topic deserved a separate hearing for discussion. She 
recommended the Subcommittee organize regional hearings to discuss minority 
incarceration rates. 45 However, there are no indications that regional hearings took place 
to discuss Disproportionate Minority Confinement. Ultimately, this shows the 
subordinate role that racial disparities played in the grand scheme of federal juvenile 
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justice policy. Researchers pushed the issue onto the Congressional floor with alarming 
data. Politicians, receptive to the message, listened to the data and instituted 
Disproportionate Minority Confinement to further examine and address the issue. But at 
no time did the House Committee on Human Resources consider racial inequalities in the 
juvenile justice system an issue of utmost importance. From the late-1970’s to the late-
1980’s, racial disparities were just another glitch in the system.  
 
DMC: The Mandate 
 In 1988, at the conclusion of the 1974 reauthorization hearings, the Committee on 
Education and Labor issued a report to the House entitled, Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention Amendments of 1988. The report recommended reauthorizing the 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act until 1992. Additionally, the Committee 
recommended adding three amendments to the bill: the Runaway and Homeless Youth 
Act, the Missing Children’s Assistance Act, and Disproportionate Minority 
Confinement.46 Recall that in 1974, how to deal with runaways and truants posed the 
greatest challenge to law enforcement officers and policy makers. Including the 
Confinement mandate as an amendment represented an important acknowledgement of 
issues of racial inequalities for youth. By establishing the Confinement Mandate, the 
federal government pledged to take the lead in pressing states to investigate and remedy 
racial inequalities in the juvenile justice system.  
 The report contained specific language pertaining to the Disproportionate 
Minority Confinement, and later the Contact, mandate. The Committee offered a layered 
approach to combating racially disproportionate youth incarceration rates. The first 	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required states to provide comprehensive efforts to reduce racially biased incarceration 
rates. Using funding from the Justice Department, states should track differences in arrest 
rates, compare processing of youth depending on their racial identity, and improve 
outreach organizations and programs that targeted minority youth.47 Assessing arrest 
rates suggested racially imbalanced incarceration rates stemmed from unequal treatment 
early on in the system, perhaps from when police officers and youth first interact. 
Furthermore, targeting agencies that work with minority youth can increase the potential 
to keep these minors out of the justice system, or to work with them to prevent recidivism 
down the road.  
 The report defined minority youth as, “youth from ethnic as well as racial 
minority groups.” Racial categories included black and Asian; Hispanic constitutes an 
ethnic category. Additionally, the Committee recommended that data distinguish not only 
between minority groups but also genders. Presumably, breaking down these racial and 
gendered groups would help target certain populations with prevention and rehabilitative 
services.48 The report’s conclusion cited that black males were four times as likely to be 
incarcerated in comparison to their white peers. Hispanic males were 2.6 times as likely 
to be incarcerated in comparison to their white peers.49 These statistics come directly 
from Krisberg’s statements before the Committee in 1987.  Ultimately, the Committee 
supported the Justice Department’s leadership role in the juvenile policy field. It 
described the goal of the mandate to implement “racially and ethnically neutral” policies 
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and practices across all state and federal juvenile facilities.50 That is to say the Justice 
Department supported juvenile justice policies with intentional language to treat 
individuals equally, regardless of their race, ethnicity, or gender.  
 Congress adopted the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Amendments 
in 1988. The Disproportionate Minority Confinement mandate, prescribing state research 
and requiring strategies geared towards providing a racially equitable juvenile justice 
system, was put into motion. Congress now required states to detect, identify, and remedy 
racial inequalities in their local systems. The mandate found inequality, or 
disproportionality, when the population of confined minority youth exceeded the 
proportion of minority youth in the general population.51 Not only states, but also 
organizations outside the Justice Department continued to gather and analyze data, 
prompting further reforms to the mandate in the future.  
 In 1989, the National Coalition of State Juvenile Justice Advisory Groups 
released a report entitled, A Delicate Balance. Directed towards the President, Congress, 
and the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, this report challenged 
juvenile justice policy leaders to think hard about the state of racial inequality among our 
young people in the criminal justice system. The report itself focused on how police and 
courts process minority youth in the juvenile justice system. The Coalition acknowledged 
that minority youth seemed to commit slightly more crime than white youth. However, 
the report suggested that biased actions of hundreds of police officers, judges, and other 
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law enforcement officials often resulted in discriminatory treatment of minority youth.52 
Ultimately, A Delicate Balance argued that,  
“… The juvenile justice system is nothing more than a shadow of the larger 
society which defines and supports it. In that sense, equity and justice, the pillars 
of our justice system, require that we look at a great deal more than our life 
pursuits- a delicate balance in a democratic society where differences and 
individuality are seen as fundamental strengths.”53  
 
Here, the Advisory Group implicitly questioned whether the federal government can 
really redress racial inequalities in the juvenile justice system. We live in a society where 
skin color shapes our worldview. Whether conscious or subconscious, intentional or 
unintentional, individual decisions as well as larger programs and policies often treat 
individuals differently based on the color of their skin. Since our juvenile justice system 
functions within our society, in order to remedy racial inequity in the system, we must 
address the structured inequalities, the inherent biases among individuals working within 
the system, and the policies that shape both the system and our society. This 
responsibility lies with individuals, but more so with institutions and with our 
government, both federal and local. These issues, entrenched in individual attitudes, 
behavior, social structure, and policy over time, reside beyond the boundaries of the 
criminal justice system.  
 Throughout A Delicate Balance, the Advisory Group recommended reforms 
relating to both operational and strategic matters affecting juvenile justice and 
delinquency prevention. The report asked President George H. Bush to designate a 
Chairman of a Special Task Force to spearhead research into differential processing 
practices throughout the juvenile justice system, and to resolve these problems. The 	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report asked Congress to hold hearings on this matter, just as Allison Fleming asked 
during the Iowa reauthorization hearing in 1987. The Advisory Group also asked 
Congress to appropriate funds to endow five model youth correctional facilities of 30 
youth or less that reduce disproportionate minority incarceration.54 Although this pilot 
program would not reduce Disproportionate Minority Confinement across the nation, 
lessons learned would help inform future efforts.  
 The greatest number of recommendations fell on the Administrator of the Office 
of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. Ultimately, the Advisory Group 
requested the Office provide leadership to states in implementing professional trainings 
and delinquency prevention strategies, encourage community colleges to connect with 
minority youth, and offer technical assistance to states.55 The Advisory Group asked the 
Administrator to implement various research reforms. These research initiatives targeted 
police practices, penalties for chronic offenders, and how law enforcement offices made 
decisions to detain minority youth. The report encouraged the Office of Juvenile Justice 
and Delinquency Prevention to take an active role in training law enforcement officials 
and court officers on sensitivity to issues of race, gender, class, and ethnicity. Moreover, 
the Advisory Group asked that individuals providing these trainings represent various 
ethnic, cultural, and educational backgrounds. The report also tasked the Administrator 
with developing strategies to share state results through conferences, seminars, 
publications, and presentations.56 In making these recommendations, the Advisory Group 
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believed these efforts would curb discriminatory treatment in the juvenile justice system 
and reduce rates of minority youth crime, and thus, minority youth confinement.  
 The Advisory Group supported their recommendations in A Delicate Balance by 
presenting information regarding minority incarceration rates and arrest rates. The report 
cited both Schwartz and Krisberg’s statistics from the 1986 and 1987 hearings, 
respectively. The report also suggested that mentally and physically disabled minority 
youth are more likely to enter the justice system, rather than appropriate health care 
facilities. In regard to arrest rates, the report cited data showing 7 in 10 young black 
males in California experience at least one arrest in their early adult years. Among the 
same white population, only 3 in 10 face one arrest.57 These trends surely contributed to 
disproportionate confinement, but also to the social consequences these young men 
experience, which create a stigma, alter life chances of youth, and ultimately, may 
increase recidivism. Therefore, the report urged those in the justice system to, 
“… Look beyond the decision process of the juvenile justice system for answers. 
We must examine the health of the minority community, the stability of family 
life, and the highly constrained life chances of youth who lives on the streets.”58  
 
 Racial disparities in the juvenile justice system are not as simple as racial 
categories. Black youth, for example, do not commit crimes because of the color of their 
skin. Rather, social constructs contribute to these disproportions, often related to racial 
boundaries. Poverty rates, employment opportunities, income distribution, and education 
levels are meaningful measures that may contribute to crime.59 The Advisory Group 
feared segregated practices in the juvenile justice system would exacerbate these trends, 
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and eventually lead to a dual society. If legal consequences continued to impair minority 
populations, whites would continue to reap benefits from a society structured to further 
their success. Ultimately, these patterns reflect a structural problem.60  
 The Advisory Group’s findings in A Delicate Balance point to worrisome, 
realistic consequences for our nation if these inequities persist. Over time, the Task 
Force, academics, and the Advisory Group strongly encouraged the federal government 
to lead efforts to redress racial inequalities in the juvenile justice system. The federal 
government took these conversations and findings seriously. In 1991, the Juvenile Justice 
Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee hosted the hearing on Minority 
Overrepresentation in the Juvenile Justice System.61 The Juvenile Justice Subcommittee 
did not exist in 1988, when the Disproportionate Minority Confinement mandate came 
into being. The hearing featured leaders from national non-profit agencies working to 
prevent juvenile delinquency, youth participating in these programs, and law enforcement 
officers.  
 Senator Herbert Kohl from Wisconsin opened the hearing by stating, “The scales 
of justice were never meant to be color coded.”62 He stated that Black youth comprise 
17% of the population, but 40% of public detention centers, and that there were more 
black youth in prison than in college. Even when black and white youth commit the same 
crime, black youth were four times as likely to be incarcerated for that offense. Kohl 
argued that detaining youth can increase mental and physical health problems, and lead to 
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unemployment and homelessness.63 Perpetuating these trends along racial lines is 
especially problematic, as Kohl asserted, because the Justice System functions most 
basically to ensure equality.  
 Joe Biden, at the time the Senator of Delaware and serving as Chair of the 
Juvenile Justice Subcommittee, echoed Senator Kohl’s sentiments. Senator Biden stated 
that on an average day, 53,000 juveniles are held in custody, of which 30,000 are 
minorities.64 Senator Biden stated these patterns reflect greater problems in society, such 
as poverty, unemployment, educational opportunities, and community violence. He 
believed federal and state programs have not kept pace with society to address youth 
needs.65   
 Following the hearing, in 1992, Congress elevated Disproportionate Minority 
Confinement to a core requirement of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
Act. This policy reflects the implications of racial disparities in the juvenile justice 
system, made explicit in A Delicate Balance. Elevating the mandate to a core requirement 
tied future state funding to state compliance. Each year, the Office of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency determines state compliance by reviewing state plans.66 If states fail to 
provide plans redressing disproportionate minority incarceration, they risk losing 25% of 
annual funding from the Justice Department.67  
 To help states reach this new standard, the Office of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention created a pilot program for five states. The program involved 	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two phases. During the first phase, states assessed the extent that disproportionate 
minority confinement occurred. In the second phase, the Office provided assistance to the 
states for designing and implementing “correction actions.”68 Assistance included 
funding, technical support for designing strategies, and technical assistance for 
implementing these strategies. Arizona, Florida, Iowa, North Carolina, and Oregon 
participated in the pilot program. 69 
 At the program’s conclusion, the Office summarized and published the results in a 
report entitled, “Disproportionate Minority Confinement: Lessons Learned From Five 
States.” Each state observed disproportionate minority confinement in its population, and 
found racial inequalities existed beyond secure facilities. In Florida, researchers found 
African-American youth overrepresented at multiple stages in the justice system, such as 
arrest and case filings.70 Oregon found similar patterns. In Iowa, researchers found 
minority youth experienced longer stays in detention centers. Implementation strategies 
for curbing disproportionality differed, from creating community-based programs to 
working with youth to changing police methods.71  
The report argued that both underlying bias in the juvenile justice system and 
unequal social circumstances contribute to racially imbalanced trends in the juvenile 
justice system. The social factors include educational attainment, family conditions, and 
economic resources. Remedying these matters was viewed as essential to completely 
address juvenile delinquency. The most significant outcome from the pilot program 
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resides in the suggestion to expand the mandate to incorporate multiple layers of the 
juvenile justice system, later named contact points. Racial disparities exist beyond just 
the confined population, and these deserve appropriate attention.72 These troublesome 
conclusions influenced continued reforms to the Confinement mandate.  
 Congress adjusted the provision again in 2002, with the shift from 
Disproportionate Minority Confinement to Disproportionate Minority Contact. This new 
terminology encompassed all racially disproportionate patterns in the juvenile justice 
system. Now, Congress required states to examine racial disparities at every contact point 
in the juvenile justice system, including arrests, charges, transfers to adult court, and 
confinement. This shift expanded attention regarding racial inequities for juveniles in the 
criminal justice system. As in the past, states were required to implement intervention 
strategies to assure racial equality and prevent juvenile delinquency.73   
 The 2002 mandate also included an important change in methodology. Recall that 
under the past Confinement provision, states compared the proportion of minority youth 
in detention facilities to their proportion in the general population. The 2002 statutory 
language required states to use the Relative Rate Index to measure disproportionality. 
States measure the Relative Rate Index (RRI) by comparing the rate of minority contact 
at a given point with the rate of white contact at the same point. Put simply, RRI= 
minority rate/ white rate.74 The quotient represents disproportionality. So, for example, 
suppose RRI in this case is used to measure disproportionate arrest rates in a given state. 
If the RRI is 4.0, minority youth are 4 times as likely to be arrested as white youth in the 	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given locality. Conversely, if the RRI is 0.5, minority youth account for half the arrest 
rate of white youth. RRI measurements prove useful because they enable policy makers 
to compare disproportionality across jurisdictions.75 In order to achieve compliance with 
the Contact mandate, states must provide a statewide RRI, as well as an RRI 
corresponding to the three most racially diverse counties, every three years. Today, many 
states release annual reports and analyze more than three counties.76  
 
Disproportionate Minority Contact Today 
 The 2002 Disproportionate Minority Contact mandate, still an amendment to the 
1974 Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, expired in 2007.77 From 2007 
until 2010, the JJDP Act was continued on an annual vote. In 2010, Representative Keith 
Ellison from Minnesota introduced the Act’s reauthorization.78 The bill discusses 
contemporary disparities that African-American youth experience in the juvenile justice 
system, and demonstrates disproportionality’s changing meaning over time.  
“In 2003, African-American youth constituted 16 percent of the adolescent 
population of the United States, but constituted 28 percent of youth arrested, 37 
percent of youth securely detained before adjudication, 30 percent of youth 
adjudicated in juvenile court, 35 percent of youth judicially waved to adult 
criminal court, 38 percent of youth sent to residential placement, and 58 percent 
of youth admitted to state prisons.”79  
 
In these statistics, legislators observed disproportionality by comparing rates of juvenile 
justice contact to the proportion of minorities in the general population. However, the bill 
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77 Ibid, 24. 
78 U.S. House. Committee on Education. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
Reauthorization Act of 2010 (H.R. 6029) http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d111:hr6029: accessed November 24, 2013.  
79 Ibid. 
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also finds disproportionality in African-American youth experiencing harsher 
consequences for committing crimes than white youth, even when they commit the same 
crime. Here, disproportionality arises by comparing the African-American and white 
youth populations in the justice system. Using both of these methodologies, measuring 
disproportionality by comparing minorities to the general population and 
disproportionality by comparing minorities to other populations in the justice system, 
reveals ambiguity in the term. What exactly does disproportionality mean? Moreover, 
legislators failed to identify the goal of DMC efforts. Given racial disparities in crime 
rates, what would be equitable contact rates for minority youth and the juvenile justice 
system?  
Ultimately, the legislation calls for increased research efforts and states its clear 
purpose is to “support effective state and local efforts to reduce the disproportionate 
numbers of youth of color involved in the juvenile justice system.”80 Representative 
Ellison’s 2007 reauthorization bill states that in 2010, “youth of color constitute 69 
percent of the youth held in secure detention.”81 Given this gross inequality, states clearly 
need further guidance in remedying racial disparities in juvenile justice.  
The JJDP Act was not reauthorized in 2010. The last action on the bill occurred 
on October 30, 2010, when the House referred the bill to the Subcommittee on Healthy 
Families and Communities.82 Since this time, the JJDP Act has been put on continuous 
resolution. While reauthorization would sustain the Office of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention and all of its programs and facilities for many years, legislators 
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81 Ibid.  
82 Ibid. 
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instead annually approve the Act. In effect, the Office of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention, its programs and facilities, live paycheck to paycheck. 
Additionally, with each passing year, the legislative package that contains it grows. In 
2013, the Disproportionate Minority Contact mandate comprised a microscopic portion 
of H5326, a bill appropriating funding to commerce, justice, and science.83  
Over time, the Disproportionate Minority Contact mandate has been bundled into 
a large legislative package, which keeps politicians from revisiting the issue. 
Disproportionate Minority Contact simply persists from year to year, and so do racial 
inequalities in the juvenile justice system. Racially charged crime patterns do not begin or 
end with the juvenile justice system. The mandate represents an action on behalf of 
federal legislators to respond, perhaps symbolically, to an issue endemic throughout our 
nation’s history: racism.  
 
Conclusion  
In reviewing Disproportionate Minority Contact’s legislative history, several 
contentious points arise. First, politicians failed to clearly and consistently define 
disproportionality. Researchers observed disproportionality when the minority youth 
population in detention facilities exceeded the proportion in the general population. 
Researchers later observed disproportionality by comparing the rates of activity in the 
justice system across racial lines. However, these formulas do not indicate how much 
disproportionality is acceptable; the methodologies merely constitute a means to an 
ambiguous end. Without a definition of equity, exactly what do these statistics mean? 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Thomas Library of Congress. “Status of Appropriations Legislation for Fiscal Year 
2013,” http://thomas.loc.gov/home/approp/app13.html Accessed November 24, 2013.  
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What should state systems work towards? Equal rates of juveniles arrested, tried in court, 
confined and put on probation according to their skin color? Progress cannot be attained 
if states do not show yearly progress, or if policy is not anchored in a concrete purpose.   
Twenty-five years after the Disproportionate Minority Confinement mandate 
came into practice, states certainly have many numbers, plans, and practices. But the 
research relies on simplistic racial and ethnic categories geared towards remedying an 
ambiguous “disproportionate” trend that lacks a clear reference point. The mandate’s 
continuous burial into legislative packages prevents policy makers from addressing or 
resolving these issues. These problems prevent federal legislation from effectively 
providing incentives and support for remedying racial disparities among minority 
juveniles. Ultimately, these failures to redress racial inequalities in the criminal justice 
system rest with federal policy makers, the legislative process, and with state and local 
justice systems. As we will see, aside from ambiguous language, states experience many 
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CHAPTER 3 




In Chapter 2, we learned that through the Disproportionate Minority Contact 
mandate, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention tasked states with 
identifying and remedying racial disparities at various stages in the juvenile justice 
system. Significant federal funding from the Justice Department obliges states to 
participate. Knowing this, how do states implement the Disproportionate Minority 
Contact mandate? What challenges do states face in doing so? This chapter analyzes the 
challenges associated with implementing the Disproportionate Minority Contact mandate 
by comparing the activities of several states in their efforts to achieve compliance. 
States face many challenges in implementing DMC, the first of which is 
appointing an individual or office to oversee compliance with the mandate. Collecting 
data to detect inequalities represents one of the biggest challenges for states, as many 
have a hard time ensuring that the many police departments, local courts, and detention 
facilities maintain accurate data on the youth they serve. Contemporary evidence suggests 
state offices fail to accurately measure racial and ethnic disparities at various points in the 
juvenile justice systems. In some communities, static racial categories fail to account for 
growing immigrant and ethnic populations. Furthermore, after analyzing statistics and 
determining racial inequalities, states must identify and implement strategies to improve 
their juvenile justice systems. After doing so, they must continue to monitor these 
programs and disparity rates. But without reliable local data, juvenile justice workers 
cannot accurately measure racial and ethnic disparities, or implement strategies to redress 
those inequalities.  
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Despite twenty-five years of tracking Disproportionate Minority Confinement and 
Contact, the Justice Department has yet to determine the source of racial inequities in the 
juvenile justice system. In 2012, all 50 states had completed the identification stage. Only 
18 states had completed the assessment phase. Thirty-four states reported they 
implemented delinquency prevention strategies, 30 of which received funding or 
technical training to implement nationally recognized models. Only four states reported 
entering the evaluation stage. This means despite an array of prevention strategies 
implemented throughout the nation, only four states systematically evaluated their 
programs. Even if these programs showed promise in curbing minority youth 
delinquency, state legislators may not have been aware the program existed. Regardless, 
in 2012, 39 states reported entering the monitoring phase.84 How can states monitor a 
system they have not yet evaluated? Are completing phases not necessary before moving 
onto the next stage? The legislation does not provide concrete compliance standards, 
provide strategies to correct problematic actions, or facilitate conversations among states 
to compare successes and failures. The mandate leaves states to creatively implement 
strategies on their own timelines. This ambiguous action plan provided by the Justice 
Department leads to inconsistent state reforms.  
This chapter focuses particularly on New England states. The minority 
populations in New England states are variable but small, such as in Rhode Island, where 
in 2010, 82% of residents identified as white, 6% as black or African-American, and 12% 
as Hispanic or Latino.85 States with small minority populations have trouble gathering 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. “In Focus: Disproportionate 
Minority Contact.” (November 2012). 
85 2010 Census. 
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accurate data on their minority populations. As a result, many DMC measurements of 
differential rates remain statistically insignificant, especially in local areas where the total 
juvenile justice populations are small.  
In order to achieve compliance and obtain full funding from the Office of Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention, states must provide data measurements and plans to 
address disparities and to monitor racial inequalities over time. Ultimately, the Office of 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention has the responsibility of overseeing state 
juvenile justice system compliance with the Disproportionate Minority Contact mandate. 
As we will see, some states have produced statistics and implemented intervention 
strategies. Other states lag behind, unable to overcome these challenges in gathering data.    
 
Compliance: Contact Points, Statistical Significance, and RRI  
 The Disproportionate Minority Contact mandate requires states to investigate 
racial and ethnic disparities at nine contact points in the juvenile justice system. These 
contact points, also known as decision points, represent instances where juveniles 
formally interact with police officers, judges, attorneys, and/or juvenile justice workers. 
At each stage, a juvenile justice professional makes a decision regarding the juvenile’s 
future in the criminal justice system.  
 The nine contact points are: arrest, referral to court, diversion, case petition, 
secure detention, delinquency finding, probation, confinement in a secure correction 
facility, and case transferred to adult criminal court.86 The Office of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention defined these nine points in the 4th edition of the Technical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, supra note #85.   
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Assistance Manual.87 An arrest occurs when a law enforcement officer stops a juvenile 
for a suspected delinquent act. Criminal adult crimes, such as crimes against persons and 
property, drug offenses, and crimes against the public order, constitute delinquent acts. 
The second contact point, referral, materializes when a law enforcement officer formally 
directs the arrested youth to the juvenile justice system. The third point, diversion, refers 
to juveniles legally processed in the arrest or referral stage, but never formally charged 
with a crime. Intake workers may dismiss, or divert, the case for lack of evidence, or 
settle the dispute informally. Law enforcement officers often intentionally divert 
juveniles to therapeutic programs or community service, recognizing the stigma of the 
justice system, and the overcrowding of juvenile facilities.88 Arrested juveniles are either 
diverted or referred to the juvenile justice system.  
The fourth point, detention, refers to youth held in secure detention while the 
court processes their case. This may occur before or after the court’s decision: courts may 
detain youth while awaiting trial or while awaiting sentencing. The fifth contact point, 
case petition, concerns cases with formal charges that appear on a court calendar. The 
next point, delinquency findings, refers to adjudications, the equivalent to convictions in 
the adult criminal courts. This represents the court’s legal finding that the juvenile bears 
responsibility for the crime committed. Probation, the seventh contact point, refers to 
those juveniles put under formal supervision in the community after adjudication. Those 
put on probation without case petitions being filed fit into the earlier diversion point. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. Disproportionate Minority 
Contact Technical Assistance Manual Fourth Edition (U.S. Department of Justice: 
2009)  
88 The Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice. “Diversion Programs: An Overview.” 
Juvenile Justice Bulletin (1999) <https://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/9909-3/div.html> 
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eighth point, confinement in a secure correctional facility, concerns adjudicated juveniles 
serving time in secure residential or correctional facilities. Group homes, shelters, and 
mental health treatment facilities do not constitute a secure correctional facility. Lastly, 
transfers to adult courts refer to cases waived to adult criminal court. A judge may weigh 
the juvenile’s age and the gravity of the criminal act, and determine that the juvenile 
should be treated as a legal adult.89   
Today, the Justice Department prescribes five steps for states to analyze and 
address minority overrepresentation in the juvenile justice system. The first step, 
identification, requires states to determine the extent that racial disparities exist in their 
juvenile justice systems. This calls for statistical evidence measured by RRI, or the 
Relative Rate Index, which compares the rates at which white and minority juveniles pass 
through respective contact points. 90  The second phase, assessment, asks states to identify 
the reasons Disproportionate Minority Contact exists, if in fact the statistics reflect racial 
inequalities. The third step, intervention, requires states to put “intervention strategies” in 
place to address the sources of overrepresentation identified in the previous phase. The 
fourth step, evaluation, asserts states must evaluate the implemented strategies for 
effectiveness and ideally, success. The final phase, monitoring, requires states to 
continuously track trends and adjust intervention programs as needed.91  
In seeking to provide identification data, states have had trouble gathering 
statistically significant RRI measurements. Statistical significance correlates to volume, 
or number of cases, commonly referred to as sample size. Generally, statistical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, supra note #88. 
90 Parsons- Pollard, Nicolle, supra note #73. 
91 “About DMC,” Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, accessed 
November 1, 2013, <http://www.ojjdp.gov/dmc/about.html> 
	   37	  
significance “expresses the probability that the result of a given experiment or study 
could have occurred purely by chance.”92 In this instance, the question is whether 
disparities in rates between whites and black, for example, represent “real” differences in 
experience, or random variations in rates over time that do not reflect underlying 
differences in experience. In practice, this means larger sample sizes are more likely to 
yield statistically significant measurements, because it is less likely the disparity occurred 
randomly.  
The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention provides baselines for 
states to use as RRI comparisons to ensure consistent, comparable measurements across 
jurisdictions. Arrests are measured by the base rate of 1,000 juveniles in the population. 
Referrals are measured per 100 arrests. Diversion, detention, and charges filed are each 
measured per 100 referrals. Delinquency findings are measured per 100 charges filed. 
Probation placements and secure correctional placements are each measured per 100 
delinquency findings. Transfers to adult courts are measured per 100 charges filed. In 
essence, each RRI measurement builds off of previous decision points to remain 
comparable across time and place.93  
   
Where Are They Now? New England and DMC in 2013 
 The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention outlines five steps for 
states to analyze and address Disproportionate Minority Contact. The Office often refers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 “Statistical Significance.” Accessed December 12, 2013. 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/statistical+significance 
93 Delay, Dennis and Steve Norton. “Juvenile Justice in New Hampshire; 
Disproportionate Minority Contact Identification 2013.” (New Hampshire Center for 
Public Policy Studies: 2013), 3.  
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to these steps as reduction activities.94 Identification, assessment, intervention, 
evaluation, and monitoring comprise these steps.95 In 2012, the Office mapped out how 
states have engaged in reduction activities.96 New England states reported compliance 
with many reduction activities.  
 In the identification phase, Connecticut, Maine, and Vermont indicated they 
gathered data for all nine contact points. Massachusetts and Rhode Island provided data 
for six or more contact points. New Hampshire published an identification report in 2012, 
after the Office’s report went to press.97 The Office requires states collect RRI data every 
three years. Only Vermont and Rhode Island indicated collecting data more often.98   
 Under the assessment phase, the Office asked states whether they had completed a 
DMC assessment within the last six years. Connecticut, Maine, and Rhode Island 
indicated doing so.99 New Hampshire completed an assessment study in 2013.100 In 
regard to the intervention phase, Massachusetts and New Hampshire reported 
implementing nationally recognized strategies to improve systems and prevent 
delinquency. Massachusetts and New Hampshire also reported funding, receiving 
funding and/or technical assistance to implement these strategies. Nationwide, 30 of the 
34 states that implemented these strategies also received funding or technical assistance 
to do so.101  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, supra note #85. 
95 Ibid.  
96 Ibid. 
97 Delay, Dennis, supra note 93. 
98 Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, supra note #85. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Delay, Dennis, supra note 93. 
101 Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, supra note #85. 
	   39	  
 In the evaluation phase, only four states from across the nation reported 
conducting one formal methodological evaluation of delinquency prevention and/or 
systems improvement strategies. Connecticut was one of these states. Among 39 states 
nationwide that reported tracking and monitoring RRI trends over time, all New England 
states claimed to be doing it. 102 
 For the purposes of this section, the identification phase will be used to analyze 
challenges to implementing the Disproportionate Minority Contact mandate. In the 
identification stage, states gather data and compute statistical measurements to identify 
racial and ethnic disparities in the juvenile justice system. These measurements provide 
the backbone to all other initiatives. Failure to gather complete or accurate data skews 
later implementation strategies.  
New England states experience challenges in producing statistically significant 
data, partly due to small minority youth populations. According to the 2010 Census, 
72.4% of all Americans identified as white, 12.6% as black or African-American, and 
16.3% as Hispanic or Latino.103 In comparison, New England states have more racially 
and ethnically homogenous populations. The following table displays the racial 
composition of New England states from the 2010 Census.104  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Ibid. 
103 U.S. Census Bureau. “An Overview: Race and Hispanic Origin and the 2010 Census,” 
accessed December 12, 2013 <http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-
02.pdf> 
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Given these small minority populations present across New England, various local courts, 
police departments, and other state offices have limited opportunities to track minority 
juveniles in the system. Furthermore, even when their statistics are accurate, these 
localities must conform to similar data-gathering practices. Ultimately, these challenges 
in data gathering prevent New England states from consistently determining where 
disparities exist, and therefore, from fully implementing the DMC mandate. These 
challenges may be similar to other states and localities where minority populations are 
low.  
 In June 2013, New Hampshire released an identification report.105 In this 
document, New Hampshire compared their RRI measurements to other New England 
state RRI data. The following table compares these statistics.106 Statistically significant 
numbers are indicated in bold. Double asterisks indicate not enough cases for any 
analysis.  
Statistically significant measurements indicate that serious disparities exist 
between white juveniles and minority juveniles. For example, in Massachusetts, 
minorities are five times as likely to be securely detained during their court case. In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Delay, Dennis, supra note 93. 
106 Ibid, 16. The author of this document does not indicate where out-of-state data were 
drawn from. Therefore, the data may be misleading.  
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Connecticut, minorities are over three times as likely to be confined in a secure 
correctional facility. In Rhode Island, minorities are four times as likely to be arrested. 
Across all New England states, minority youth clearly interact with the juvenile justice 
system at much higher rates than white youth.  
 
 
 RRI measurements for cases diverted present a separate trend in racial disparities 
in juvenile justice. As evidenced above, across all New England states, minorities were 
diverted at higher rates than their white peers. In Maine, minority juveniles were diverted 
at twice the rate of their white peers. Case diversions represent a concerted effort on 
behalf of localities to keep a juvenile out of the system, and in the community. 
Disproportionate diversion rates in favor of minorities should be viewed as a step towards 
remedying racial disparities in juvenile petition, delinquency finding, and secure 
confinement.  
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The table above not only illustrates disparities but also suggests states’ inability to 
gather full and statistically significant data sets. This surely hinders efforts to identify and 
to remedy causes of disparities. Without a consistent, complete data set, real disparities 
cannot be analyzed, and states cannot move forward in remedying racial inequalities 
amongst juveniles.  
In examining the African-American population, racial discrepancies become more 
pronounced. The following chart illustrates these inequalities across New England. This 
chart also confirms state inability to gather complete RRI data sets.  
107 
In Connecticut, African-American youth were referred to juvenile court at almost 
five times the rate as white youth. These youth were also three times as likely to be 
confined in a secure facility. In Rhode Island, African-American youth were arrested at 
over nine times the rate of their white peers. African-American youth also experienced 
secure confinement at more than double the rate than their white peers. In Massachusetts, 
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these juveniles were arrested at almost three times the rate than white youth. African-
American youth were also detained at twice the rate of white youth. In New Hampshire, 
these juveniles were arrested at over three times the rate of their white peers. African-
American youth were almost twice as likely to be detained. In Vermont, African-
American youth were arrested at over twice the rate of white youth. In Maine, these 
youth were twice as likely to be arrested as their white peers, but also twice as often were 
diverted from the juvenile justice system.108  
After twenty-five years of research into racial inequalities in the juvenile justice 
system, and twenty-five years of “reduction” efforts, substantial racial disparities 
continue to exist in New England. Additionally, states still struggle to produce full data 
sets. Without complete information, states can find it difficult to implement meaningful 
changes to their juvenile justice systems. The Disproportionate Minority Contact mandate 
appears not to have significantly impacted this unfortunate reality. The following case 
studies elaborate on state challenges in identifying and remedying racial disparities in the 
juvenile justice system.  
 
Case Studies: Vermont, Massachusetts, and Maine  
Vermont  
 In 2012, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention indicated that 
Vermont had completed only the identification and monitoring stages.109 In the New 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 These data sets call a separate, equally important question into focus: Why do minority 
youth, and African-American youth in particular, interact with the juvenile justice system 
at such high rates. This question is addressed in the third and final chapter of this project.  
109 Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, supra note #85. 
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Hampshire identification report, research indicated Vermont measured six statistically 
significant RRI measurements. Vermont RRI’s for all minority youth appear below:  
 
110 
Given these Vermont RRI measurements, minority youth do not appear to 
experience much inequality in the juvenile justice system. Minority youth were arrested 
at slightly higher rates than white youth, and referred to juvenile court at double the rate 
for white youth. However, these racial disparities exist at only two early contact points. 
The rates of minority secure detention, probation placement, and transfer to adult court 
are lower for minorities than for whites. Perhaps DMC has worked effectively to reduce 
overt discrimination in the Vermont juvenile justice system.111 However, this conclusion 
may be unwarranted, given what we know about problems implementing DMC in 
Vermont.  
 Information directly from the Vermont State Advisory Group to Delinquency 
Prevention indicates the state has faced many challenges in complying with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Delay, Dennis, supra note #93, 16.  
111 The New Hampshire identification report does not reference the source of New 
England state data. It is unclear where Vermont RRI’s actually come from, given 
Vermont has not published their own identification report.  
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Disproportionate Minority Contact mandate. This Advisory Group exists within The 
Children and Family Council for Prevention Programs, and functions to advise state 
legislators, monitor state compliance with the JJDP Act, and make grants in conjunction 
with the Department for Children and Families.112 The Advisory Group, composed of 
community members, state and non-profit professionals, fulfills a JJDP Act provision.113 
It has the responsibility to monitor minority youth contact with the Vermont criminal 
justice system to protect youth, but also to ensure Vermont remains eligible for federal 
delinquency prevention funding.114  
In 2011, the Advisory Group issued an annual report to the Vermont Agency of 
Human Services.115 The report acknowledged Disproportionate Minority Contact 
constituted a JJDP Act core requirement. The report faulted law enforcement officials 
with Vermont’s inability to meet full DMC compliance, because of insufficient data 
gathering. Police officers, prosecutors, and court administrators failed to track racial 
identification for over 65% of the juveniles in the system.116 Although Vermont has 
collected and monitored minority youth in the juvenile justice system for ten years, it has 
not yet determined the rates at which African-American youth enter the justice system, as 
compared to white youth. Although the Advisory Group designed and implemented 
strategies to remedy this data-gathering problem, law enforcement officials have failed to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Vermont State Advisory Group to Delinquency Prevention. “2011 Annual Report.” 
Children and Family Council for Prevention Programs (Vermont Agency of Human 
Services: 2011). 
113 A core requirement of the JJDP Act requires each state establish a Juvenile Justice 
Advisory Committee to comply with the DMC mandate.  
114 Vermont State Advisory Group, supra note #112, 2. 
115 Vermont State Advisory Group, supra note #112. 
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improve their practices.117 Improving these practices represents an essential task to 
continued compliance with the DMC mandate, and to identifying and tracking racial 
disparities in the Vermont juvenile justice system. Ultimately, the Advisory Group 
recommended increased state leadership to resolve inadequate data collection.  
This case study also illustrates how easily states can achieve compliance. 
Vermont achieved compliance with the mandate by tracking disparities among only 35% 
of the youth in the juvenile justice system. Ultimately, the data sets reported by Vermont 
are very misleading. Vermont has not successfully implemented the DMC mandate. In 
reality, it is unclear if racial disparities even exist in the Vermont juvenile justice system.  
 
Massachusetts 
 In 1996, Massachusetts’ researchers submitted a Disproportionate Minority 
Confinement Analysis Final Report to the Massachusetts Executive Office of Public 
Safety and the Governor’s Juvenile Justice Advisory Committee.118 The report included 
interviews with juvenile justice workers, law enforcement officers, juveniles on probation 
and in state custody, and detention data.119 Since researchers compiled these data during 
the Disproportionate Minority Confinement mandate, the research did not include RRI 
statistics for other contact points. In speaking with individuals working in the juvenile 
justice system, researchers discovered that officers who identified as minorities were 
more likely to indicate disparate treatment of minority youth in the system.120 In speaking 
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118 Forcier, Michael W., Marc R. Berube, Beverly C. Sealey, and Kevin W. Smith. 
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(Social Science Research and Evaluation, Inc: 1996). 
119 Ibid, 52-53. 
120 Ibid, 52. 
	   47	  
with juveniles on probation and in state custody, minority youth voiced concerns about 
unfair treatment due to the color of their skins.121  
The researchers also analyzed detention data from 1993 to determine 
disproportionality. They found African-American and Hispanic males were placed in 
secure facilities more often than white males.122 Researchers analyzed court data, as well, 
focusing particularly on differential adjudication rates. But these measurements did not 
produce statistically significant differences.123 Ultimately, the 1996 report uncovered 
some disparities in the Massachusetts juvenile justice system, but produced uneven 
statistical evidence, and failed to determine sources of apparent inequalities. Researchers 
recommended establishing a comprehensive client tracking system, among other 
initiatives. 124 These recommendations, it was hoped, would provide a solid foundation 
for Massachusetts to continue analyzing and addressing racial inequalities in their 
juvenile justice system.  
 But Massachusetts failed to move forward with these initiatives. In 2003, the 
Massachusetts American Civil Liberties Union branch issued a report entitled, 
Disproportionate Minority Confinement in Massachusetts: Failures in Assessing and 
Addressing Overrepresentation of Minorities in the Massachusetts’ Juvenile Justice 
System.125 The report attacked the Massachusetts Juvenile Justice System for failing to 
continue DMC research after the 1996 report. ACLU researchers determined that 	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122 Ibid, 54. 
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125 Dahlberg, Robin. “Disproportionate Minority Confinement in Massachusetts: Failures 
in Assessing and Addressing the Overrepresentation of Minorities in the 
Massachusetts Juvenile Justice System.” (Massachusetts American Civil Liberties 
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approximately 7 in 10 juveniles in the Massachusetts system identified as youth of color. 
While the state wrote plans to reduce disproportionality, implementation never occurred. 
Between 1998 and 2003, the state received $35 million in OJJDP funding, but less than 
$600,000, or less than 2%, went towards programs to identify and minimize racial 
disparities.126  
 As the ACLU report implies, Massachusetts’ ability to comply with the mandate 
illustrates the legislation’s weakness in enforcement. The ACLU claimed the state lacked 
leadership in addressing DMC, had not accurately measured the scope of racial 
inequalities in the system, had not identified the sources of these disparities, had not 
implemented planned projects, and had not properly allocated federal funding to these 
initiatives.127 The ACLU recommended the Governor re-vamp the Juvenile Justice 
Advisory Committee, make reducing racial disparities among juveniles a priority, 
identify the roots of these disparities, and monitor disproportionate statistics statewide. 
The ACLU also recommended that the Governor require local police departments and 
other agencies to comply with data collection efforts and contract with an independent 
evaluator to conduct thorough investigations.128  
 The ACLU report suggested Massachusetts DMC reduction activity stagnated due 
to the Advisory Committee’s composition. In 1997, 16 of the Committee’s 26 members 
were full-time government employees who were apparently uninterested in changing the 
system. The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention twice recommended 
that the Committee reduce the number of government employees. But in 2003, 12 of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Massachusetts American Civil Liberties Union. “Disproportionate Minority 
Confinement in Massachusetts.” accessed December 12, 2013 (2006). 
127 Dahlberg, Robin, supra note #125, 1-2. 
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23 members on the Committee were still full-time government employees.129 The 
Committee members met sporadically, and kept their meetings closed to the public.130  
Massachusetts participated in the Office’s 1999 Disproportionate Minority 
Confinement Intensive Technical Assistance Initiative. But, following this consultation, 
the state failed to implement the technical recommendations from the Office.131 
Ultimately, the Committee appeared to represent a superficial effort to comply with the 
DMC mandate and secure funds from the federal government: government employees 
“attending private meetings” with ambiguous plans to continue DMC research simply to 
secure federal funding for matters unrelated to racial disparities in the juvenile justice 
system. Massachusetts’ ability to do so, while retaining compliance status, again 
highlights the weakness of the compliance provisions in the Disproportionate Minority 
Contact legislation.   
 Today, private citizens, professors, non-profit directors, and government 
employees constitute the Massachusetts Juvenile Justice Advisory Committee.132 In 2012, 
the Committee released a three-year plan, which included updated DMC reduction 
activities.133 The report indicated that many issues persist with data gathering practices 
across Massachusetts, however. Referral, diversion, and cases transferred to adult court 
statistics appear to be missing for all racial and ethnic groups. Furthermore, arrest data 
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did not distinguish Latinos as an ethnic population, skewing the white arrest rate.134 The 
Committee indicated a statewide data collection system would be implemented in 
2013.135   
 The Committee concluded their 2012 plan by outlining future reduction plans and 
the budget associated with these activities.136 The Committee did not allocate any funding 
to the identification stage, assessment phase, to the Subcommittee itself, or to community 
organizations.  The Committee did indicate directing funding towards programs and 
methods aimed to reduce DMC. But this funding appears conditioned on donations the 
Committee receives. Therefore, the Committee did not include a specific estimate of the 
funding these programs might receive.137  
Furthermore, the report listed statewide RRI data between 2005 and 2011.138 
Between these years, black juveniles experienced detention at almost 6 times the rate of 
white juveniles and confinement at almost 7 times the rate of white youth.139 The 
statistics present two pressing issues. First, these statistics suggest gross inequalities in 
the juvenile justice system. Second, Massachusetts has only gathered data for two contact 
points in the juvenile justice system. Despite this history and persistent failures to gather 
accurate data, Massachusetts’ ability to “maintain compliance” with the Disproportionate 
Minority Contact mandate once again illustrates the ineffectiveness in enforcing DMC 
legislation.  	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137 Ibid, 73. 
138 It is unclear where these RRI measurements come from, who conducted these studies. 
Furthermore, these statistics are inconsistent with the NH data set. 
139 Ibid, 63. 
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Deficient DMC funding in Massachusetts highlights another important failure in 
the Disproportionate Minority Contact mandate. Although states must comply with DMC 
reduction activities to receive full funding from the Office of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention, the mandate does not require states to direct any portion of that 
funding to DMC activities. As a result, the effectiveness of the mandate appears to rest on 
the good will and commitment of local and state officials, but not the oversight of the 
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.  
 
Maine 
 The distinct African immigrant and refugee populations in Portland and Lewiston, 
Maine present an important case study to analyze Disproportionate Minority Contact’s 
effectiveness. Maine’s ethnic population has grown quickly since 1990. The 1990 census 
indicated Cumberland County contained 98.1% white individuals and 0.6% black 
individuals. A similar population distribution existed in Androscoggin County at that 
time, with 98.5% whites and 0.5% blacks.140 The 2010 census, however, indicates a rapid 
change in Maine demographics. In Cumberland County, 92.8% of individuals identified 
as white, while 2.4% of individuals identified as black or African-American. Likewise, in 
Androscoggin County, 92.8% of individuals identified as white, while 3.7% of 
individuals identified as black or African-American.141 Additionally, 2005-2010 
American Community Survey data indicated 19.35% of foreign-born in Cumberland 
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County migrated from the African continent. In Androscoggin County, 22.74% of 
foreign-born migrated from Africa.142  
 Given these demographics, Maine researchers have found the Disproportionate 
Minority Contact methodology particularly challenging to implement. The static racial 
categories administered by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention fail 
to accurately represent the diversity of minority youth in Maine.143 Specifically, the 
“black or African-American” category fails to measure ethnic diversity, such as first-
generation African descent.  
 Maine did not begin gathering or analyzing DMC data in the juvenile justice 
system until 2005. At this time, Kenny Moire from the Maine Statistical Analysis Center 
started analyzing the state’s existing juvenile justice databases.144 Moire found the police 
departments databases failed to track offender’s race and ethnicity, but that the Maine 
Department of Correction’s database, CORIS, did track race and ethnicity. However, if a 
corrections officer left the ethnicity question blank, the database automatically answered 
“non-Hispanic.”145 This setting clearly warped data. Neither the police database nor 
CORIS aided Disproportionate Minority Contact data gathering practices in 2005.  
Ultimately, Moire’s 2005 report illustrated the obstacles in locating existing data 
sets to carry out DMC studies. He called for future surveys and data gathering measures 	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143 The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention requires states measure 
DMC using the following census categories: white, black or African-American, 
Hispanic or Latino, Asian, American Indian or Alaska Native, and Native Hawaiian 
or Other Pacific Islander.  
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be aligned with DMC policy and practice. In 2006, the Maine Department of Corrections 
changed the ethnicity setting in CORIS, enabling accurate race and ethnicity data 
gathering through the system.146  
In 2009, Maine released its first identification study.147 Researchers analyzed 
disproportionality in six counties. Although the minority youth population in Maine 
continues to expand, the rural areas in Northern Maine simply do not contain enough 
minority youth for meaningful RRI measurements. Therefore, researchers did not analyze 
the northern-most Maine counties for disproportionality.148 The report attributes the 
growing minority youth population in Southern Maine to African immigration.149 
Research also indicated black and African-American youth experience arrest and referral 
at higher rates than their white peers. Additionally, these youth experienced diversion less 
than white youth. But since the black and African-American category does not 
distinguish between African-Americans and ethnic Africans, immigration’s impact on 
Maine’s juvenile justice system remains unknown.150 
The 2009 report also included results from interviews taken with 18 juvenile 
justice professionals, including judges, Juvenile Community Corrections Officers, and 
Assistant District Attorneys from around the state. These individuals voiced concerns 
regarding the way the Juvenile Justice system was working with the African immigrant 
population in Maine. They suggested that language and communication barriers, as well 
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as limited youth community programs, propel crime and juvenile justice contact amongst 
African youth (see appendix from Maine probation juveniles and DYS juveniles).151 
Most recently, Maine began tracking immigrant youth in the Long Creek 
Detention Center. Before each juvenile enters the facility, a corrections officer issues a 
detention form, or survey, which gathers information regarding the juvenile’s personal 
background, court case, and reason for detention. The survey began tracking information 
regarding juvenile immigration status in 2012.152 These questions prove particularly 
important in gauging juvenile justice system involvement by members of Maine’s 
growing immigrant and refugee population.  
The survey asks several questions to probe the juvenile’s ethnic background.153 
Between 2012 and October 2013, 85 minority juveniles were surveyed, of which 80% 
identified as Black, 16.5% as Asian, and 3.5% as Hispanic.  When asked if their family 
had recently arrived in the United States, 14 juveniles responded yes. Of these families, 6 
came from Sudan, 2 from Somalia, and the others from Congo, Kenya, and Qatar. 
Additionally, the survey gauged family language background. When interacting with law 
enforcement, twenty-one juveniles responded their parents would need a translator. 
Acholi, Arabic, French, and Somali proved the most common languages among 
juveniles, with Vietnamese, Spanish, and Neur translators requested, as well. These 
surveys indicate minorities in Maine are represented in the juvenile justice system and 
come from a variety of different racial, ethnic, linguistic, and cultural backgrounds.  	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Tapping into the immigrant and refugee population in Maine proves important to 
understand and respond to DMC because these youth may experience different factors 
that contribute to their contact with the juvenile justice system. These include the lack of 
community resources and problematic communication in contact with the juvenile justice 
system. The Disproportionate Minority Contact mandate must adjust its methodology to 
allow for accurate representation of local state populations. Maine officials have taken 
the initiative to do this on their own, but until Congress reforms the mandate’s language 
to account for these sorts of variations, the mandate will be ineffective in measuring and 
remedying some inequalities in the juvenile justice system.  
 
Conclusion 
In analyzing RRI measurements from across New England, we see that states 
experience many challenges in implementing the Disproportionate Minority Contact 
mandate. Case studies reveal failure to gather full data sets and use of static racial 
categories that prevent states from accurately analyzing their local youth populations. The 
mandate underestimates the complexity of gathering data from a myriad of state agencies. 
Furthermore, low standards for compliance keep state and local agencies from unifying 
data-gathering methods. Knowing the state can achieve compliance at such a low 
threshold, state offices have little incentives to change their ways. But without reliable 
measurements, states cannot redress racial inequalities in juvenile justice. 
Maine’s experience indicates a problematic aspect of Disproportionate Minority 
Contact lies in racial categories. Recall that the Justice Department defines minorities in 
both racial and ethnic terms, using census categories: African-American, American 
Indian, Asian, Pacific Islander, and Hispanic categories. These racial categories put forth 
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by the Justice Department are used to gather data and analyze populations. But these 
static categories do not fully represent dynamic population diversity; rather, they disguise 
other sources of diversity. With surging immigration rates, these racialized categories 
become increasingly varied. For example, the African-American category includes youth 
with varying skin color, from both the North American continent, the African continent, 
and beyond. Likewise, the Hispanic category includes those from Mexican, Dominican, 
Puerto Rican, and Spanish decent, among other ethnic backgrounds.154 What do these 
youth really have in common, other than their skin color, national origin, or language? 
Static racial or ethnic categories lose significance as our population continues to 
diversify. This issue may be particularly important in states where recent immigrants 
constitute a significant proportion of the people of color.  
Furthermore, as evidenced by the Vermont and Massachusetts case studies, the 
legislative standard regarding state compliance with the Disproportionate Minority 
Contact mandate appears troublesome. Currently, states must report RRI every three 
years, and must show plans addressing observed disparities. However, states are not 
required to show any progress in redressing these disparities. In 1990, the Office of 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention released the first Technical Assistance 
Manual to promote uniform state approaches to Disproportionate Minority Contact. But 
states have never been required to read, follow, or consult the technical manual. While 
states may have the ability to creatively address local issues, the Justice Department does 
not facilitate collaboration between states. Furthermore, the low standard for compliance 
does not encourage states to act urgently.  
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Twenty-five years after the Justice Department first required states to track and 
analyze racial inequalities amongst criminal youth, states have not determined the full 
extent and sources of these disparities. Ultimately, trouble implementing 
Disproportionate Minority Contact suggests the mandate is simply too tall an order for 
state juvenile justice systems to fulfill. Lacking resources and incentives, progress 
depends on driven and enthusiastic state officials to successfully conduct DMC studies, 
and work towards remedying racial inequalities in juvenile delinquency. But would 
gathering accurate RRI measurements even help solve racial disparities in juvenile 
justice? A look into the sources of these crimes can help explain the Justice Department’s 
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CHAPTER 4 




 This chapter analyzes the societal factors contributing to Disproportionate 
Minority Contact’s failure to curb racial disparities in the juvenile justice system. As we 
learned in Chapter 2, Disproportionate Minority Contact legislation tasks states with 
detecting disproportionality, identifying the source of this inequality, and remedying 
racial disparities in their local juvenile justice systems. This chapter revealed several 
problematic elements built into DMC legislation, such as ambiguous language and weak 
enforcement strategies. In Chapter 3, we analyzed the effectiveness of Disproportionate 
Minority Contact by studying implementation efforts and problems in New England, 
particularly in Vermont, Massachusetts, and Maine. But the question remains: why 
exactly do racial inequalities in the juvenile justice system persist? Is discriminatory 
treatment in the juvenile justice system the only explanation of disproportionality? Is the 
juvenile justice system truly equipped to remedy broader, societal factors, leading to 
disproportionality and redress persistent racial inequalities?  
 Two competing theories explain minority overrepresentation in the juvenile and 
criminal justice systems. The first theory claims the justice system discriminates against 
certain groups, pulling them into the system, and then earmarking these individuals as 
criminals, keeping them in the system disproportionately. The second argues that 
underlying social conditions create and perpetuate differing rates of delinquency among 
social groups, and that disproportionality in juvenile justice simply reflects these 
underlying differences. Many factors contribute to delinquency, including but not limited 
	   59	  
to, poverty and disadvantaged neighborhoods and poor schools and their disciplinary 
policies. In this view, to understand why racial disparities in the juvenile justice system 
persist requires that we look outside of the juvenile justice system. 
Despite widely accepted and publically acknowledged theories of criminology, 
the Disproportionate Minority Contact mandate does not address and has no impact on 
underlying social conditions. Disproportionate Minority Contact encourages state 
juvenile justice systems to perform an internal audit to detect practices or policies fueling 
racial disparities in juvenile justice processing. By its internal system focus, DMC 
ignores the societal conditions affecting delinquency. This chapter examines several of 
these societal factors, including poverty and disadvantaged neighborhoods and disparities 
in school discipline, which drive disparities in juvenile delinquency. Further, this chapter 
explores police tactics and federal criminal justice initiatives, which also drive disparities 
in entering the juvenile justice system. Racial disparities in poverty reflect a fundamental 
social structure which help shape how these latter institutions, namely police departments 
and public schools, function. Although both institutions utilize tactics that are non-
discriminatory in intent, clear disparities in their outcomes cannot be overlooked. This 
chapter analyzes these factors, showing that underlying social conditions create and 
encourage delinquency, and institutionalized practices perpetuate racial disparities in 
delinquency. 
 
Disparities In Conditions: Poverty and Disadvantaged Neighborhoods  
In 1967, President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Commission on Law Enforcement and 
Administration of Justice released the following statement:  
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“The Commission… has no doubt whatever the most significant action that can be 
taken against crime is action designed to eliminate slums and ghettos, to improve 
education, to improve jobs… We will not have dealt effectively with crime until 
we have alleviated the conditions that stimulate it.”155  
 
Poverty, particularly concentrated poverty, greatly contributes to delinquency. In 
America, minorities experience poverty and live in areas of concentrated poverty more 
often than do whites. Although many assume housing segregation no longer exists in 
America, contemporary data paint a different picture.  
In 2012, the median household income for all Americans was $51,017, but varied 
greatly according to race and ethnicity. 156 Asians earned the greatest income, with a 
median earning of $68,636.157 The median income for white, non-Hispanics was $57,009 
and for Hispanics was $39,005.158 Black Americans earned the lowest median income, at 
just $33,321 per year.159 These differences can be seen over time in Figure 1 below. 160  
In 2012, 15% of Americans were living in poverty. Like income, poverty rates 
vary by race and ethnicity. In 2012, 9.7% of white, non-Hispanics experienced poverty 
and 11.7% of Asians did so. Amongst Hispanic and Black Americans, 25.6% and 27.2% 
of individuals experienced poverty, respectively. 161  
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Figure	  1	  
Moreover, minorities are more likely to live in areas of concentrated poverty, especially 
after the recession. 162 Between 2005 and 2009, 12.2% of the white population lived in 
areas of concentrated poverty, compared to 49.2% of the black population.163 
In order to understand just what concentrated poverty looks like in America, it 
helps to analyze particular metropolitan areas as examples. Map 1 depicts concentrated 
poverty in Cook County, Illinois. The official variable mapped is Poverty Status in the 
Past 12 Months (Black of African-American alone).164  
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The map indicates the census tracts  in and around the Chicago area are densely 
populated with Black or African-Americans living below the poverty line. Typically, 
concentrated poverty is indicated when 30% of individuals in a given census tract live 
under the poverty line. In Cook County, over 50% of census tracts are comprised of at 
least 28.2% of African-American residents living below the poverty line.  
Not only are black families very likely to live in areas of concentrated poverty, 
they are much more likely than poor white families to live in these concentrated, poor 
neighborhoods. Map 2, also of Cook County, Illinois, depicts the Poverty Status in the 
Past 12 Months (White Alone, Not Hispanic or Latino).165  
By comparing Map 1 and Map 2, African-Americans clearly inhabit areas of 
concentrated poverty at much higher rates than whites. Less than 12% of census tracts in 
Cook County contain 30% or more white residents living under the poverty line.166 
Clearly, African-Americans in the Chicago region experience concentrated areas of 
poverty much more often than Whites. This phenomenon is observed in metropolitan 
areas across the nation.167 
Poor, minority individuals often live under different life circumstances than do 
white Americans. Racial segregation and concentrated poverty greatly impact crime and 
delinquency patterns among African-Americans. Just as African-Americans 
disproportionately experience residential segregation, African- 
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Map	  2 
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Americans disproportionately encounter the criminal justice system. Several factors fuel 
this process. 
Typically, residential stability and strong community organizations encourage 
strong ties, or bonds, among community members. These strong institutions work to 
prevent crime across society. This happens, according to social control theory, because 
when individuals are engaged with community institutions, they seek to comply with 
local laws to continue receiving rewards from those institutions. Individuals form bonds 
with these institutions, which criminologist Travis Hirschi defines as attachment, 
commitment, involvement, and belief.168 The greater the bonds individuals feel with local 
institutions, the more likely they are to obey local laws, since following the rules enables 
them to continue to engage these with institutions. Ultimately, it’s not the consequences 
they fear from breaking the law, but the rewards they seek to continue to obtain from 
family, school, and work. Strong institutions, such as good public schools, may provide 
greater resources and rewards to individuals than weak institutions, and therefore greater 
incentives for local residents to comply with local laws.169  
If excluded from rewards in weak community institutions and from mainstream 
economic markets, residents of these neighborhoods can also organize to create 
alternative networks. Concentrated areas of poverty are often socially disorganized 
neighborhoods, where individuals don’t experience conventional forms of order. Social 
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disorganization theory states that in disorganized communities, residents are more likely 
to develop “alternative opportunity structures,” which may include criminal subcultures. 
These alternative opportunity structures include street gangs, drug dealing, and 
prostitution.170 Surely not every individual in an inner-city community engages in illegal 
activities. But those who do are making a rational choice to engage in these activities. 
This is not a matter of character. For inner-city youth, the short-term social rewards and 
financial benefits of selling drugs or committing a minor theft may greatly outweigh 
compromising college plans or professional success.171 Moreover, the chasm created 
between those employed and those who engage in alternative markets results in a lack of 
common neighborhood values and an inability to institute effective social controls.172  
The Disproportionate Minority Contact mandate fails to target poverty, housing 
patterns, and community institutions as factors contributing to racial disparities in the 
juvenile justice system. These social conditions rest entirely outside of the criminal 
justice system’s jurisdiction, and the implementation of DMC studies leaves concentrated 
poverty as a separate issue, independent of delinquency. In reality, the two are 
intertwined, and one problem cannot be solved without addressing the other. This 
oversight in DMC legislation again reinforces the mandate’s failure to remedy racial 
disparities in juvenile justice.   
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Disparities in Delinquency: Police Tactics and the Impact of Federal Initiatives  
In the context of these neighborhood patterns, police tactics also perpetuate racial 
disparities in the criminal justice system. As evidenced above, African-Americans are 
more likely than other racial groups to experience poverty and also to live in areas of 
concentrated poverty, which often have high crime rates. Likewise, police are more likely 
to monitor these areas closely. In areas of concentrated poverty, particular kinds of crime 
often take place in public. In these neighborhoods, settling disputes and selling drugs 
often occurs on the streets, instead of in work place or in residences, as in middle or 
upper class neighborhoods.173 For example, in 2011, 76 murders in Chicago occurred 
indoors, but 357 occurred outdoors. The following graph displays how this trend has 
increased over time. 174  
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Outdoor crime, specifically in socially disorganized neighborhoods, simply makes 
it easier for police to detect crime and make an arrest. Crime and violence in public 
(illegal actions with inherent visibility) warrant individual, departmental, and political 
action. In order to make a drug “bust” in a socially disorganized neighborhood, law 
enforcement officers can easily pose as drug buyers and enter the environment. Since 
buyers are relatively prevalent on public streets, this is a viable police tactic. In order to 
make an arrest in a middle or upper class community however, law enforcement officers 
may spend months working to arrest one or two individuals, because sales occur in 
private spaces and closed networks. Since police departments encourage volume of 
arrests, it is simply more efficient for law enforcement officers to police socially 
disorganized minority neighborhoods. This brings a bigger arrest pay off than planning 
one bust in an upper class neighborhood over the same period of time.175  
Federal policies perpetuate differential policing in these neighborhoods, 
exacerbating racial inequalities in the criminal justice system. Racial disparities in the 
criminal justice system are particularly concentrated in drug charges, a consequence of 
the War on Drugs. This happens despite evidence that rates of drug use are consistent 
across racial groups.176 In 1985, before the War on Drugs began, there were a higher 
proportion of whites sentenced for drug offenses than of blacks. However, as the War on 
Drugs took hold, these proportions rapidly changed. In 1985, 42.70% of sentenced state 
prisoners for drug offenses identified as black. By 1995, this figure grew to 59.60%. 	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Conversely, between 1985 and 1995, the percentage of white sentenced state prisoners 
for drug offenses dropped from 54.50% to 38.30%.177 As evidenced here, blacks 
experience state prison sentencing for drug offenses disproportionately, compared to 
whites. This disproportionality arises not from differential rates of drug use, but from 
drug enforcement practices, that end up targeting African-Americans.  
 The War on Drugs, racially neutral in intent, clearly has a discriminatory 
outcome. As criminologist Michael Tonry argues,  
“The issue is no longer whether social disorganization and economic disadvantage 
predispose the people affected by them to crime; it is whether the crime control 
policies and justice system practices can be made less socially destructive.”178 
 
Although the War on Drugs appeared to be a criminal justice intervention to make 
neighborhoods safer, the campaign actually hurts these neighborhoods and damages 
individuals. By targeting low-level drug offenders and giving law enforcement officers 
maximum use of personal discretion, the War on Drugs has encouraged police to monitor 
concentrated areas of poverty and make arrests by volume. But selectively punishing 
minor drug offenders ignores the chronic social and economic conditions that frame these 
disadvantaged communities and the decision-making process of the residents.179 Today, 
the policies from the War on Drugs era continue to function across our legal system. 
Unfortunately, there has been very little backlash against these policies, as not many 
politicians speak up to challenge these practices.180 Policies enacted as part of the War on 
Drugs have become commonplace in police departments, and given the tendency for 
states to focus on the working of their juvenile justice systems as part of the 	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Disproportionate Minority Contact mandate, studies do not identify local police tactics 
reinforced by federal government policies as factors contributing to delinquency.  
Furthermore, decisions by the Supreme Court permit continued use of law 
enforcement strategies that help produce racial disproportionality in the justice system. In 
1987, the Supreme Court declared that without a showing of discriminatory intent, parties 
could not challenge racial bias under the 14th amendment. The case involved Congress’ 
infamous distinction between crack cocaine and powder cocaine. The Court declared that 
even when shown statistical evidence of racially disproportionate effect, the law would 
stand without clear evidence of discriminatory intent.181 This ruling, and others like it, 
make it virtually impossible to challenge discriminatory police and criminal justice 
policies in court.  
Fundamental police tactics are perceived to be non-discriminatory, which the 
Supreme Court confirms, regardless of disparate outcomes. Ultimately, these decisions 
protect police discretion and the War on Drug policies. The Court continues to require 
evidence of discriminatory intent; discriminatory effect is not sufficient. Thus, not only 
do local and state police agencies and the federal government encourage police tactics 
that disproportionately target minorities, but the justice system protects this practice. So 
long as this continues, the Disproportionate Minority Contact mandate will have little 
meaningful effect on remedying racial disparities in juvenile justice.  
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Disproportionate School Discipline: Suspensions, Expulsions, and Criminality  
 Our schools also help drive racial disparities in juvenile justice. Often referred to 
as the “school to prison pipeline,” this phenomenon reflects America’s tendency to 
punish youth rather than educate them. The pipeline contains several elements, from 
failing public schools, to policing school hallways, and disciplinary alternative schools. 
School disciplinary policies, particularly suspensions and expulsions, greatly increase a 
student’s chance of coming into contact with the juvenile justice system.182 In order to 
remain eligible for funding, the federal government requires schools to suspend and expel 
students for possessing deadly weapons on school grounds, but many school districts 
have developed school disciplinary codes that penalize students for much smaller 
infractions, such as minor disturbances during class time. Repeated removal from the 
classroom, coupled with suspensions and expulsions, are detrimental to student learning, 
and also to their social development and general wellbeing.183 School disciplinary 
policies, a factor completely outside the jurisdiction of the juvenile justice system, 
contribute to racial disparities in juvenile delinquency, and yet, are not discussed in state 
DMC studies.   
By examining the evolution of school disciplinary codes, we see the policies used 
to penalize students go beyond federal requirements. In 1994, President Clinton signed 
the Gun-Free Schools Act into law, which gave schools federal funding when they 
expelled and referred students to the justice system if the student brought a weapon to 
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school. This legislation prompted many schools to adopt more stringent policies, such as 
suspending or expelling students for bringing any weapon to campus, beyond firearms.184 
By 1997, 79% of schools nationwide had adopted zero-tolerance disciplinary policies 
towards alcohol, drugs, and violence, as well.185 Since the inception of these zero-
tolerance policies, suspensions have become commonplace in our nation’s schools. In 
1974, 3.7% of all students experienced at least one suspension. In 2006, 6.8% of all 
students experienced at least one suspension.186 
 In 2011, researchers in Texas issued a report examining the intersection between 
school disciplinary records and juvenile delinquency. The study involved the seventh 
grade classes in Texas from 2000, 2001, and 2002, almost one million students.187 In 
order to determine the impact of school discipline policies on future juvenile 
delinquency, researchers compared student disciplinary records with their juvenile 
records from their seventh grade year until their expected year of high school graduation. 
The Texas Education Agency and the Texas Juvenile Probation Commission provided 
these documents.188 Given that Texas runs the second largest school system in the nation, 
with five million students, and that 2/3 of students are nonwhite, the trends identified in 
this study are particularly striking.189  
 Study participants included 51% male students and 49% female students. In terms 
of demographics, 14% of these students identified as African-American, 40% as 
Hispanic, and 43% as white or non-Hispanic. Additionally, 13% of students qualified for 	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special education services, and 60% of students were classified as economically 
disadvantaged (receiving free or reduced-cost meals).190 The evidence shows that 70% of 
the study participants obtained their high school diploma or GED on time.191 At the same 
time, between seventh and twelfth grade, 75% of African-American students became 
involved with the school disciplinary system, compared to 64.8% of Hispanic students 
and 46.9% of white students.192  
Only 3% of Texas school disciplinary actions occurred in response to federal 
requirements, where student behavior required suspension or expulsion for the school to 
continue receiving federal funding. The remaining disciplinary actions took place under 
local school policies. Those students suspended or expelled, particularly those repeatedly 
disciplined, were more likely to be held back or to drop out. In Texas, 31% of students 
suspended or expelled between seventh and twelfth grade repeated a grade at least once. 
In contrast, only 5% of students without a disciplinary history were held back. 
Additionally, 10% of students suspended or expelled between seventh and twelfth grade 
dropped out.193 
Furthermore, students disciplined in school exhibited a much higher chance of 
coming into contact with the juvenile justice system. In Texas, more than one in seven 
students came into contact with the juvenile justice system between seventh and twelfth 
grade. Those students suspended or expelled for discretionary matters were three times as 
likely to be in contact with the juvenile justice system in the following year.194 Only 2% 
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of students who did not experience school disciplinary action became involved with the 
juvenile justice system.195 
Given this clear connection between school disciplinary action and juvenile 
justice intervention, racial disparities in school disciplinary action become increasingly 
worrisome. In Texas, researchers found that many students experienced school 
disciplinary action, but as indicated earlier, these rates varied across gender and race. 
Over the course of their post-secondary education, 54% of Texas students experienced in-
school suspension. These suspensions ranged from one hour to several consecutive days, 
where a student spent time out of his or her ordinary classroom.196 African-American 
students and students with disabilities were most likely to be disciplined and removed 
from the classroom. Amongst African-American males, 83% were removed from the 
classroom at least once for a “discretionary violation.” Additionally, 74% of Hispanic 
male students were removed at least once, and 59% of white male students. Amongst 
females, 70% of African-American students had been removed at least once, 58% of 
Hispanic students, and 37% of white female students.197 While the Texas school district 
disciplinary codes may not be discriminatory in their intent, the policies are certainly 
disproportionate in their outcome.198 
 With respect to out-of-school suspensions, 26.2% of African-American students 
them for their first behavioral violation, while 18% of Hispanic students and 9.9% of 
white students received the same treatment.199 Ultimately, minority students encountered 
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the school disciplinary system many more times than other students, and were then 
treated more harshly in the system. Among African-American students, 25.7% received 
11 or more discretionary disciplinary actions, while 18.1% of Hispanic students and 9.5% 
of white students experienced as many disciplinary actions.200 
 Across the Texas schools, 25.6% of African-American males became involved in 
the juvenile justice system, more than the 22% of Hispanic males or 13.9% of white 
males.201 Similar trends existed among females, with 14.4% of African-American 
females coming into contact with the justice system, 12.7% Hispanic females, and just 
7.9% of white females.202 This translates to one in five African-American students in 
contact with the juvenile justice system, one in six Hispanic students, compared to one in 
ten white students.203 As evidenced by this study on the Texas public school system, 
racial disparities in school disciplinary policies clearly contribute to racial disparities in 
juvenile justice.  
 Since this 2011 report, several other studies have investigated racial disparities in 
school disciplinary codes and the impact of disciplinary actions on juvenile delinquency. 
Currently, black students without disabilities are three times as likely to be suspended or 
expelled from school.204 A UCLA study found that in 10 states, including California, 
Connecticut, Delaware and Illinois, in the 2009-2010 school year, more than 25% of 
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black students were suspended. Additionally, the increase of police officers on school 
grounds has dramatically increased criminal charges filed against youth.205 
 Minority students, particularly African-American males, clearly experience 
school disciplinary action at higher rates than their peers, and this trend directly correlates 
with racial disparities in the juvenile justice system. However, state DMC studies have 
yet to identify school disciplinary policies as a factor contributing to juvenile 
delinquency. These studies, by nature, call for state organizations to analyze their own 
systems: local police treatment of juveniles, juvenile justice processing and arrest 
methods, and resources for juveniles. Schools are clearly one source of racial disparities 
in the juvenile justice system, but schools reside entirely outside of the criminal justice 
system’s jurisdiction. Therefore, suspensions and expulsions are unlikely to be identified, 
or remedied, as a result of DMC studies. Ultimately, this foreseeable inefficiency of the 
mandate prevents the legislation from having a meaningful impact on redressing racial 
disparities in juvenile justice.  
 In response to alarming school disciplinary policy trends, the Department of 
Education and the Department of Justice partnered to issue new guidelines for school 
disciplinary actions to reduce disparities among students. On January 8, 2014, the 
departments jointly issued the Dear Colleague Letter on the Nondiscriminatory 
Administration of School Discipline.206 The letter guides schools in disciplining students 
without discriminating against them on the basis of race, color, or national origin.207 The 
Departments recommend that schools approach discipline by blending several strategies, 	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including conflict resolution, restorative practices, counseling, and structured systems of 
positive interventions.208 Potential remedies to discrimination include correcting records 
of those students treated unfairly, providing compensatory academic services to those 
removed from academic instruction, implementing teacher disciplinary trainings, 
providing in-school behavior support for students, creating teacher-student mentoring 
programs, conducting forums for students and administrators to discuss disciplinary 
matters and policies, and revising disciplinary policies to be have less ambiguous 
language.209 These remedies ensure compliance with Titles IV and VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964.210 
 In order to encourage compliance, the letter concretely defines discrimination. It 
reaffirms the anti-discrimination provisions in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, prohibiting 
discrimination in schools and among individuals who are recipients of federal financial 
assistance.211 The Departments indicate that they suspect that any racial disparities in 
school discipline may result from differential treatment from school policies or practices 
with adverse, discriminatory effects.212 Additionally, the Departments state that both 
differential treatment and disparate impact of disciplinary policies constitute 
discrimination.213 Here, the Department breaks from Supreme Court decisions discussed 
earlier in this chapter, acknowledging disparate outcomes are just as problematic as 
discriminatory intent. These disciplinary policies often limit students’ instructional time, 
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contributing to the “school to prison pipeline.”214 In defining discrimination and outlining 
discriminatory treatment, the Department of Education and the Department of Justice 
accomplish a task that the DMC legislation did not. Disproportionate Minority Contact 
legislation is not grounded in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, because the Act does not 
address discriminatory practices of criminal justice institutions. 
 
Conclusion  
Testimony and hearings recounted in Chapter 1 suggested politicians and 
community members thought carefully about racial disparities in the juvenile justice 
system in developing DMC legislation. So why has DMC proved to be so ineffective? As 
we have seen, a major reason is that it fails to account for factors outside of the juvenile 
justice system, such as poverty, police tactics, criminal sanctions, and school disciplinary 
policies, which contribute to disparities. Moreover, our justice system legally protects 
some of the discriminatory policies of police and criminal justice policies, regardless of 
their disparate impact. So long as that happens and racial disparities exist within 
institutions outside the juvenile justice system, racial disparities will persist in juvenile 
justice. Ultimately, many institutions drive disproportionately in juvenile justice, and 
many of these institutions operate beyond the jurisdiction of the Disproportionate 
Minority Contact mandate.  	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CHAPTER 5 
Conclusion: Why DMC Has Had Limited Effect 
In 1974, 75.2% of juveniles arrested identified as white, and 22.5% as black. By 
2002, 25.7% identified as black, and by 2012, 32.2% identified as black.215 Despite the 
Disproportionate Minority Confinement and Contact mandates, these figures show that 
disproportionality regarding minority youth in juvenile justice has only increased. 
Although Disproportionate Minority Contact may have a marginal effect on rates of 
juvenile delinquency, the mandate has not remedied racial disparities in the juvenile 
justice system, as minority youth increasingly come into contact with law enforcement at 
higher rates than their white peers.  
Optimistic politicians from the 1980’s and 1990’s crafted the Disproportionate 
Minority Confinement mandate, and later the Contact mandate, with high expectations. 
However, the language of the mandate was ambiguous. Although the Office of Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention prescribed five steps to analyze and address minority 
overrepresentation in juvenile justice, they did not require states to complete these steps 
in their prescribed order. Although the mandate became a hurdle for states to overcome in 
order to receive full funding from the Justice Department, it did not require them to put 
any federal funding back into prevention programs, or into their DMC efforts, in any 
capacity. With little guidance and limited oversight by the Office of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention, the Disproportionate Minority Contact mandate fails to 
encourage states to actively research and remedy racial disparities in juvenile justice. 
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When states do actively work towards researching and remedying racial 
disparities in their local juvenile systems, they face many obstacles in implementing the 
mandate. In 2008, the U.S. Criminal Justice system contained 50 primary state law 
enforcement agencies, 3,063 sheriffs’ offices, 12,501 local police departments, and a 
myriad of courts, probation offices, and juvenile detention facilities. Furthermore, these 
agencies employed over 1.2 million individuals.216 In order for state juvenile justice 
offices to merely obtain accurate data regarding the races of youth in contact with the 
justice system, each of these offices and jurisdictions must conform to the same data-
gathering practices. Unfortunately, uniform data-gathering practices regarding race and 
ethnicity are unrealistic at this time; neither the Justice Department nor state DMC 
agencies have the power to make these state and local agencies conform to data-gathering 
methods. Without accurate data regarding disproportionality, states cannot move forward 
to remedy disparities. But would accurate measurements really work to mitigate racial 
disparities in juvenile justice? 
As we have seen, many factors contribute to the mandate’s inefficiencies, and to 
increased contact between minority youth and the justice system. Schools, concentrated 
poverty, federal initiatives, and the justice system together create, perpetuate, and protect 
racial disparities in the criminal justice system. Disproportionate Minority Contact 
initiatives will never address these societal sources of racial inequalities in juvenile 
delinquency. By nature, the DMC legislation encourages state juvenile justice systems to 
examine their practices and policies to determine if they fuel racial disproportionality in 
juvenile involvement in the system. While these findings may help improve subtle biases 	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and inefficiencies in local systems, major forces contributing to juvenile delinquency 
exist entirely outside of the juvenile justice institutional structure. Until Disproportionate 
Minority Contact legislation adjusts to this fact, the mandate will not have a meaningful 
impact on racial disparities in juvenile justice.  
 
Moving Forward  
 Where do we go from here? Instead of continuing to fund the Disproportionate 
Minority Contact mandate on continuous resolution, politicians, juvenile justice workers, 
and academics need first to revisit the mandate. In reviewing the mandate, Congress 
should raise the bar for state compliance. Too often the Office of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention recognizes states’ “future plans” as compliance with DMC. 
Compliance with the mandate should entail regular reports, and concrete action by state 
advisory groups. Furthermore, the Justice Department should require that states use a 
portion of juvenile justice funding towards DMC studies, juvenile crime prevention, and 
programs for youth. This will incentivize states to take the mandate seriously, and not 
view it simply as a hurdle to obtain funding.  
 Moreover, the federal government needs to invest in our underprivileged 
communities. Using a socioeconomic, not racial, lens is essential to doing this. Changing 
fundamental, underlying conditions is the only meaningful way to prevent juvenile 
delinquency and reduce disproportionate involvement in the juvenile justice system. Race 
often overlooks class in our criminal justice system. Adding a socioeconomic component 
to DMC, and to criminal justice reform in general, is integral to curbing racial disparities 
in the justice system.  
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“The Commission… has no doubt whatever the most significant action that can be 
taken against crime is action designed to eliminate slums and ghettos, to improve 
education, to improve jobs… We will not have dealt effectively with crime until 
we have alleviated the conditions that stimulate it.”217  
 
The Disproportionate Minority Contact mandate may be useful in raising 
awareness of persistent racial disparities in juvenile justice, with the potential to spark a 
state movement both inside and outside of the justice system. Unfortunately, today, the 
Disproportionate Minority Contact mandate, and the tools states have to comply with it 
are not sufficient to remedy significant racial disparities in the juvenile justice system.  	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APPENDICES  
Open-Ended Responses Provided by Maine Probation Juveniles and DYS Juveniles 
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